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Testing for Consistency: Certain Digital Tax Measures and WTO Non-discrimination 
Okanga Ogbu Okanga 
Abstract  
Few issues have challenged tax policymakers and commentators as much as digital taxation has in 
recent years. Ongoing efforts to reconstruct the rules of international tax to “properly” govern the 
taxation of the global digital economy have evoked some important tax and trade related 
considerations. As regards the latter, unilateral attempts by various states – partly spurred on by a 
lack of multilateral consensus – to tax nonresident digitalized businesses threaten to disrupt 
international trade relations, with threats of trade war exchanged between some World Trade 
Organization (WTO) member states over the propriety of the proposed tax measures. As the 
conversation on the underlying tax issues progresses, this article examines the consistency of some 
features of the various unilateral digital tax measures with the fundamental WTO principle of non-
discrimination, as contained in the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). Using the 
French Digital Service Tax (French DST) as a focal point, the article argues that there is a case to 
be made that some common features of the unilateral digital tax measures violate either the most 
favoured nation or national treatment rules of WTO non-discrimination.  
 
Keywords: International Tax, International Trade, Digitalization, E-Commerce, WTO, Non-
discrimination, Most Favoured Nation, National Treatment.    
 
1. Introduction: Digital Trade and International Tax Concerns 
The basic premise of free trade, advanced since the time of Adam Smith and David 
Ricardo, is that the welfare of residents of all countries is enhanced if they can 
purchase goods and services at their lowest prices on the world market.1  
Digitalization has steadily emerged as a catalyst for business process modernization, enhanced 
productivity, cost saving, wealth creation, consumers’ choice expansion, expedited globalization, 
economic integration, and rapid international trade expansion.2 Despite this array of positives, the 
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1 Paul R. McDaniel, Trade and Taxation, 26(4) Brooklyn J. Int’l L. 1621–25 (2001).  
2 See  Christoph Ungerer, Marco Hernandez & Gallina A. Vincelette  How Economic Integration Can Increase Living 
Standards in the Western Balkans (2018) https://www.brookings.edu/blog/future-development/2018/11/19/how-
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Exports, But Face Rising Trade Barriers, The Competition Disruption Project (2019) http://www.project-
disco.org/21st-century-trade/040319-online-services-drive-exports-face-rising-trade-barriers/; Peggy Abkemeier, 
Cross-Border Trade: PayPal’s $400B Business (2017) https://www.paypal.com/stories/us/cross-border-trade-
paypals-400b-business; Javier López González & Janos Ferencz, Digital Trade and Market Openness OECD Trade 
Policy Papers 217 (Paris: OECD 2018); OECD, Trade In the Digital Era (2019) https://www.oecd.org/going-




digitalization of international trade poses significant challenges, especially for governments, 
policymakers, and businesses. One issue is whether current trade rules adequately address trade in 
the digital age.3 Existing multilateral trade rules were negotiated when digital trade was in its 
infancy and, even if conceived to be technologically neutral, questions arise over whether they 
might require clarifications to reflect new forms of, and issues raised by, digital trade.4 A second 
fundamental issue borders on the interaction between digital trade and international taxation. There 
are different facets to this issue. For starters, cross border digital services undermine the ability of 
governments to maximize the local tax base. This is because digital services continue to supplant 
numerous physical products5 and digital traders continue to replace local shops and physical 
establishments.6 These transformations reduce a government’s tax collection in at least three ways. 
First, the closure of countless factories, offices, shops and establishments erodes land-based 
revenues from property taxes and development charges.7 Second, fewer physical goods could 
reduce the taxes levied on production or value addition to physical goods.8 Third, taxes collected 
on the salaries and wages of local conventional workers disappear when those workers are 
rendered unemployed by the rise of the digital economy.9 To aggravate matters, technical gaps in 
 
digital/trade-in-the-digital-era.pdf. [OECD - Trade in the Digital Era]; John-ren Chen & Christian Smekal, Should the 
WTO Deal with E-trade Taxation Issues? 9(4) Progress in Dev. Stud. 339 (2009).   
3 OECD - Trade In the Digital Era ibid.  
4 Ibid. The United States, Mexico and Canada Agreement 2019 (USMCA) is a rare trade agreement with substantial 
provisions on digital trade. The Agreement prohibits a Party from imposing customs duties, fees, or other charges on 
or in connection with the importation or exportation of digital products (e-books, videos, music, software, games, etc.) 
transmitted electronically, between a person of one Party and a person of another Party. The Agreement, nevertheless, 
allows a Party to impose internal taxes, fees, or other charges on a digital product transmitted electronically, provided 
that those taxes, fees, or charges are imposed in a manner consistent with the Agreement. That seems to imply, in one 
sense, that the measure must not be discriminatory. See USMCA, Art. 19.3.  
5 Christopher Mims, A Surprisingly Long List of Everything Smartphones Replaced (2012) 
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/428579/a-surprisingly-long-list-of-everything-smartphones-replaced/.  
6 Nathaniel Meyersohn, American retailers already announced 6,000 store closures this year. That's more than all of 
last year (2019) https://www.cnn.com/2019/04/16/business/store-closures-retail-bankruptcies/index.html.  
7 See Vijay Govindarajan et al, The Problem with France’s Plan to Tax Digital Companies (2019) 
https://hbr.org/2019/07/the-problem-with-frances-plan-to-tax-digital-companies 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. See also Policy Horizons Canada, The Next Digital Economy (2019) https://horizons.gc.ca/en/2019/06/20/the-
next-digital-economy/ Although digitalization has a diminishing effect on conventional jobs when digital services are 




the current international tax regime result in a serious fiscal leakage with respect to cross-border 
digital trade income.10 The incomes of digital businesses are often derived remotely by nonresident 
businesses or corporations (NRCs),  rendering such incomes non-liable to tax in the source states 
and costing source states significant taxable revenue losses.11 The current international tax rules, 
which allocate taxing powers among states, were designed as far back as the 1920s, a time when 
digitalized commerce did not exist.12 Generally, under the current rules, a state can only tax the 
income of an NRC if the NRC has a permanent establishment (PE) in that state and derives income 
through the PE.13 That means having some form of physical presence.14 The evident negative 
impact of digital trade on domestic tax revenue, which remains unsolved, has aroused a sense of 
tax injustice and prompted states to fashion various measures to tax income arising from digital 
trade. Faulhaber identifies two underlying concepts that characterize the adoption of digital tax 
measures by states. First, such measures illustrate that countries believe that the current 
international tax system is outdated and needs to be reformed. Second, digital tax measures focus 
on three elements of the existing system that countries believe need to be reformed: the physical 
presence requirement, the low tax rates available in some countries, and the ability of 
multinationals in particular to earn income without having a physical presence or to shift income 
 
delivered remotely, digitalization also has the effect of creating many new jobs. See Karim Sabbagh et al, World 
Economic Forum, Digitization for Economic Growth and Job Creation: Regional and Industry Perspectives (2013) 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/GITR/2013/GITR_Chapter1.2_2013.pdf. The problem in the present case is that 
those new jobs are largely based overseas, which means that they are outside the tax net of the local authorities.  
10 Rifat Azam, Global Taxation of Cross-Border E-Commerce Income, 31(4) Va. Tax Rev. 639–52 (2012).  
11 See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Three Steps Forward, One Step Back? Reflections on “Google Taxes” and the 
Destination-Based Corporate Tax 2 Nordic Tax J. 69 (2016).  
12 See OECD, Public Consultation Document Secretariat Proposal for a “Unified Approach” Under Pillar One 
9 October-12 November 2019 (Paris: OECD 2019) [OECD Unified Approach]. 
13 See Julie Bellemare, Evolution of the Permanent Establishment Concept, 65(3) Can Tax J. 725 (2017). 
14 OECD Unified Approach supra n. 12, at 7, para. 21.  




to low-tax jurisdictions.15 The ensuing sections of this article highlight some of the features often 
found in the digital tax measures and how these features interact with WTO non-discrimination.   
2. Taxing Digital Trade  
A recent KPMG survey reveals that a vast majority of countries have introduced some form of 
digital trade tax measure.16 These measures are based on two main models: those that seek to adapt 
existing tax treaty principles to the peculiarities of digital trade17 and those that seek to impose a 
digital service tax (DST).18 These largely unilateral measures are being discussed by Members of 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) Inclusive Framework 
on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) towards a consensus-based approach to digital 
taxation.19 Action 1 of the OECD BEPS Project seeks to address specific challenges raised by 
digitalization.20 Work on this action point has seen the development of digital tax proposals by the 
Inclusive Framework. The proposals are predicated on the concept of value creation, which, simply 
put, seeks to ensure that taxes are paid where economic value is created.21 The proposals so far 
 
15 See Lilian V. Faulhaber, Taxing Tech: The Future of Digital Taxation, 39(2) Va. Tax Rev. 145 (2019). 
16 See KPMG, Taxation of the Digitalized Economy: Direct Taxes (2020) 
https://tax.kpmg.us/content/dam/tax/en/pdfs/2020/digitalized-economy-taxation-developments-summary.pdf  
17 This consists of Action 1 of the OECD BEPS Project as well as the European Union’s digital PE proposal.  
18 This consists of some radical changes to existing tax rules proposed or introduced by the European Union, as well 
as some individual states within and outside the EU.  
19 OECD, Public Discussion Draft BEPS Action 1: Address the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy 24 March 
2014-14 April 2014 (Paris: OECD 2014); OECD, Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digital Economy, Action 1—
2015 Final Report (Paris: OECD 2015) [OECD BEPS 2015 final report]; OECD, Tax Challenges Arising from 
Digitalization—Interim Report 2018: Inclusive Framework on BEPS (Paris: OECD 2018); OECD, Addressing the 
Tax Challenges of the Digitalization of the Economy—Policy Note: As Approved by the Inclusive Framework on BEPS 
on 23 January 2019 (2019) https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/policy-note-beps-inclusive-framework-addressing-tax-
challenges-digitalisation.pdf; OECD, Tax and Digitalization, OECD Going Digital Policy Note (2019) 
(www.oecd.org/going-digital/tax-and-digitalisation.pdf); OECD, Public Consultation Document Addressing the Tax 
Challenges of the Digitalization of the Economy 13 February-6 March 2019 (Paris: OECD 2019); OECD, Programme 
of Work To Develop a Consensus Solution to the Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitalization of the Economy: 
Inclusive Framework on BEPS (Paris: OECD 2019); OECD Unified Approach supra n. 12; OECD, OECD Secretary-
General Tax Report to G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (Riyadh: OECD 2020).   
20 See OECD BEPS 2015 final report ibid; Joachim Englisch, BEPS Action 1: Digital Economy – EU Law Implications 
2015(3) British Tax Rev. 280 (2015). 
21 For analysis of “value creation” see Johannes Becker & Joachim Englisch, Taxing Where Value Is Created: What's 
'User Involvement' Got to Do with It? 47(2) Intertax 161 (2019); Itai Grinberg, User Participation in Value Creation 
2018(4) Brit. Tax Rev. 407 (2018).  




considered by the OECD include the significant digital presence, the withholding tax model, the 
equalization levy, the user participation proposal, the marketing intangibles proposal and more 
recently the “Unified Approach”.22 Despite years of work, attaining a consensus on these proposals 
has proven challenging.23 The impasse can be attributed to diverging interests among states and 
the inherent difficulty in constructing a system that represents a radical departure from existing 
international tax norms. There are significant considerations bordering on the reallocation of taxing 
rights between jurisdictions; fundamental features of international taxation, such as the traditional 
notions of PE and the applicability of the arm’s length principle; the future of multilateral tax co-
operation; the prevention of aggressive unilateral measures; and the intense political pressure to 
tax highly digitalized multinational enterprises.24 Perhaps, only a political solution that is built on 
compromise, rather than “right”, can be break the impasse.  
Paralleling OECD discussions, the European Commission (EC) and several European Union (EU) 
countries have advanced proposals for taxing the digital economy.25 The EC’s two proposals are 
the significant digital presence proposal and the digital services tax proposal. Each proposal  
outlines certain criteria that a business must meet to be eligible for digital taxation.26 While the EU 
 
22 OECD BEPS 2015 final report supra n. 19; OECD Unified Approach supra n. 12. For discussion of these proposals 
see Chukwuemeka Stanley Ndibe, A Review of the Proposals for Taxation of Profits of Businesses in the Digitalized 
Economy, University of Western Ontario Master of Laws Research Repository (2019) https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/llmp/5/; 
Daniel Bunn, Tax Foundation Response to OECD Public Consultation Document: Secretariat Proposal for a “Unified 
Approach” under Pillar One (2019) https://taxfoundation.org/response-to-oecd-public-consultation-document-
secretariat-proposal-for-a-unified-approach-under-pillar-one/; Pasquale Pistone, João Nogueira & Betty Andrade, The 
2019 OECD Proposals for Addressing the Tax Challenges of the Digitalization of the Economy: An Assessment, 2(2) 
Int’l Tax Stud. 1 (2019). 
23 Mark Scott, Push for Global Digital Tax Agreement Stalls Amid Tensions (2020) 
https://www.politico.eu/article/digital-tax-taxation-oecd-france-united-states-bruno-le-maire-facebook-amazon-
apple-google/; Chris Giles & Jim Pickard, UK to push on with digital tax in face of US anger (2020) 
https://www.ft.com/content/c80079ca-3c61-11ea-a01a-bae547046735. 
24 OECD Unified Approach supra n. 12 at 4, para. 7.   
25 See European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive Laying down Rules relating to the Corporate Taxation 
of a Significant Digital Presence, COM (2018) 147 final (2018) [EC Council Directive]; United Kingdom Finance 
Act 2015, c. 11.   
26 Ibid, Art. 4.1. See also Wei Cui, The Superiority of the Digital Services Tax Over Significant Digital Presence 
Proposals, 72(4) National Tax J. 839–842 (2019). 




states failed to reach a consensus on any of the above proposals, individual EU states have initiated 
digital tax measures of their own. Simultaneously, a flurry of Asian countries, emboldened by their 
EU counterparts, have followed suit.27 Many of the unilateral measures draw similarities with some 
of the OECD (pre-Unified Approach) and EC proposals. Examples are India’s equalization levy 
and significant economic presence measures.28  
Of the measures in play, the French DST has attracted the most attention and appears likeliest to 
trigger a trade conflict. For context, France’s 2019 DST legislation is a modified version of the 
EC’s DST proposal.29 The law imposes a 3% tax that applies to about 30 companies generating 
more than €750,000,000 in global digital sales and more than €25,000,000 in France.30 The tax 
applies to turnover from online advertising, the sale of data for advertising purposes, and fees 
derived from linking users to online sales platforms.31 The revenue attributable to France is the 
proportion of the worldwide revenue from the corporation’s taxable services that are derived from 
French users, determined by a percentage that is based on the location of users in France and 
number of accounts opened in France.32 The French DST is designed as a temporary measure 
pending an international (e.g. OECD-wide) consensus on digital trade taxation. In the meantime, 
unilateral digital tax measures continue to be met with stiff opposition from the U.S. The U.S. 
argues that it should be the only country taxing U.S. companies involved in digital trade,33 that the 
 
27 See Govindarajan et al supra n. 7. See KPMG supra n. 16.   
28 See Finance Act 2019, No. 13, section 4. See, generally, KPMG ibid.  
29 This is also the case with DST measures adopted by EU states like Austria and Spain.  
30 Terry Sprackland & Stephanie Soong Johnston, French Senate Passes DST Despite U.S. Tariff Threats, Tax Notes 
Intl 243 (2019 https://s3.amazonaws.com/pdfs.taxnotes.com/2019/2019tni28-20.pdf  
31 Ibid.  
32 EY, French Government Submits Draft Bill on Digital Services Tax to Council of Ministers (2018) 
https://www.ey.com/gl/en/services/tax/international-tax/alert--french-government-submits-draft-bill-on-digital-
services-tax-to-council-of-ministers.   
33 Colin Wilhelm, U.S. Retaliation Still Looms in French Digital Tax Talks (1) (2019) 
https://news.bloombergtax.com/daily-tax-report/u-s-retaliation-still-looms-in-french-digital-tax-talks 




measures discriminatorily target its companies,34 and has repeatedly threatened to retaliate against 
any country that tries to impose such measures.35 
Although there are differences between the measures that states have initiated to tax digital trade, 
some common threads can be identified. First, the measures aim at highly digitalized business 
models. Second, they seek to deviate from traditional taxing rules by targeting businesses that lack 
a physical presence in the taxing jurisdiction, but, nevertheless, ‘operate’ there remotely. Third, 
the measures are marketing jurisdiction or destination-based, to the extent that they seek to tax 
where the customers and clients are located irrespective of where the business is located. Fourth, 
the measures contemplate the use of some taxability threshold, which may be users, income, or 
transactions. Fifth, there is a preference for direct taxation that is based on turnover rather than 
profits. While each of these features raises tax policy concerns, there is also an international trade 
law concern that such measures may contravene WTO disciplines.36 It is trite that WTO principles, 
generally, prohibit discriminatory trade treatment among members.37 Since the countries seeking 
to implement (unilateral) digital tax measures  also subscribe to the WTO and its rules, would they 
be in contravention of those rules by implementing measures with some discriminatory features? 
 
34 U.S. corporations like Google, Amazon, Facebook, and Apple are reputed to be the biggest players in the digital 
space. See Naomi Jagoda & Emily Birnbaum, Trump Escalates Fight over Tax on Tech Giants, (2019) 
https://thehill.com/policy/technology/472915-trump-escalates-fight-over-tax-on-tech-giants   
35 Pierre Briançon, Why the U.K. and France play against type in digital tax row with the U.S., (2020) 
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/why-the-uk-and-france-play-against-type-in-digital-tax-row-with-the-us-2020-
01-23 
36 See Hosuk Lee-Makiyama, The Cost of Fiscal Unilateralism: Potential Retaliation against the EU Digital Services 
Tax (DST), ECIPE Occasional Paper 5 (2018); Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Zhiyao (Lucy) Lu, The European Union’s 
Proposed Digital Services Tax: A De Facto Tariff ( 2018) https://www.piie.com/system/files/documents/pb18-15.pdf; 
PWC, A white paper analyzing the EU’s 2018 proposed digital services tax (interim measure) under WTO law (2018) 
https://www.pwc.com/us/en/services/tax/assets/dst-under-wto-law.pdf; Anna Dias & Olivier Prost, French Digital 
Services Tax and Proposed US Retaliation Measures: Preliminary Legal Analysis (2019) 
https://www.gide.com/en/news/french-digital-services-tax-and-proposed-us-retaliation-measures-preliminary-legal-
analysis 
37 William J Davey, Non-discrimination in the World Trade Organization the Rules and Exceptions (Hague Academy 
of International Law 2012); Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, Reciprocity, Non-discrimination and Preferential 
Agreements in the Multilateral Trading System 17 European J of Political Economy 281–282 (2001). 




This issue is taken up in the following sections. If the measures are based on international 
consensus between affected states, the above concerns are not likely to arise since WTO rules 
generally allow states to negotiate their tax relationships, especially as regards direct taxes.38 As 
one commentator fairly observes:  
When considering the three different proposals for new tax measures discussed in this 
chapter, it is fairly obvious that neither (a) an extension of the PE concept to an SDP or other 
form of VPE nor (b) a treaty-based extension of WHT to returns on digitally provided 
services create serious issues with respect to WTO law. Since either extension would have 
to be based on DTCs and would fall under the rules concerning direct taxes, such measures 
would benefit from the carve-outs found in GATS Article XIV(d) for measures intended to 
ensure the ‘equitable and effective imposition or collection of direct taxes in respect of 
services or service suppliers of other Members’ and in GATS Article XIV(e) for measures 
intended to apply DTC provisions.39 
The focus here is, therefore, on unilateral tax measures that fall outside the contemplation of 
subsisting double taxation conventions (DTC), e.g. measures with features such as those found in 
the EC/French DSTs.      
3. Digital Trade Taxation and WTO Non-discrimination 
The WTO is a multilateral trade body established pursuant to the Marrakesh Agreement of 1994 
(WTO Agreement). The WTO Agreement is an umbrella treaty  setting out a series of agreements, 
among which are the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the General Agreement 
on Trade in Services (GATS) and the Agreement on Trade-related aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPs).40 Two key pillars of the WTO are market access and non-discrimination, serving 
as major drivers of trade liberalization.41 The latter principle, non-discrimination, demands that 
 
38 See Jinyan Li, Relationship Between International Trade Law and National Tax Policy: Case Study of China, (2005) 
59:2 Bulletin for Intl Taxation 77.  
39 See Werner Haslehner, EU and WTO Law Limits on Digital Business Taxation in W. Haslehner et al, eds., Tax and 
the Digital Economy Challenges and Proposals for Reform 25 at 45 (Kluwer Law International BV 2019).     
40 See Li supra n. 38 at 78.  
41 Marta Carmo, International Trade Law, Double Taxation Agreements and the Principle of Non-Discrimination, 
3(3) RJLB at 928–929 (2017).  




contracting parties to an international economic treaty shall not treat domestic market actors more 
favorably than foreign market actors (national treatment principle) or differentiate between foreign 
market actors from different origins (most favoured nation principle).42 What these 
antidiscrimination clauses require is equal treatment of members that are “similarly situated” on 
the basis of their prevailing conditions.43 A domestic tax or regulatory measure may be 
discriminatory in one of two ways: where there is an intent to discriminate (also referred to as 
purpose or motive or aim) and where the effect of the measure is discriminatory (also referred to 
as disparate impact).44 Intent to discriminate may be found in the expressed views of the legislators 
or regulators to put in place the measure or in the overall motive of the government in putting in 
place the measure, as gleaned from the wordings of the measure itself.45 The effect theory of 
discrimination looks at whether the measure has a discriminatory effect or impact against 
imports.46 It is also well established that non-discrimination obligations not only apply to measures 
that differentiate directly – or de jure – on the basis of origin, but also to indirect – or de facto – 
discriminatory measures.47 De jure discrimination is apparent on the face of the measure while de 
facto discriminatory measures do not explicitly differentiate between imported and domestic goods 
or services but distinguish between them on the basis of their characteristics.48 The prohibition of 
discrimination is enshrined in both GATT and GATS via their respective MFN49 and national 
treatment obligations.50 Non-discrimination applies to all types of governmental trade obstacles, 
 
42 Nicolas F. Diebold, Standards of Non-Discrimination in International Economic Law, 60 Intl Comp LQ 831 (2011).  
43 Julia Ya Qin, Defining Nondiscrimination Under the Law of the World Trade Organization, 23 Boston Uni Intl LJ 
215 at 218 (2005).  
44 See Simon Lester, Bryan Mercurio & Arwel Davies, World Trade Law, Text, Materials and Commentary (3rd ed, 
Hart Publishing 2018) at 259–260.  
45 Ibid at 260.  
46 Ibid.  
47 Diebold supra n. 42 at 832.  
48 Lester, Mercurio & Davies supra n. 44 at 263.  
49 GATT Art. I and GATS Art. II. 
50 GATT Art. III and GATS Art. XVII:1. 




such as border measures (e.g. tariffs and quantitative restrictions) and internal regulations (e.g. 
taxes and product standards).51  
Some of the arguments against unilateral digital tax measures hinge on both aspects of non-
discrimination. Such arguments can be found, for instance, in the U.S. complaint against France 
and the EC’s DSTs respectively – the USTR Report on France’s Digital Services Tax published in 
December 2019.52 The U.S. contends that the French DST, by its structure and operation, is 
intended to discriminate against U.S. Companies.53 The U.S. concludes that the selection of the 
digital services covered by the tax, including carve-outs in the definition of such services, targets 
U.S. companies,54 while the DST’s revenue thresholds likewise target U.S. companies as opposed 
to French ones.55 The USTR Report points to statements made by responsible French officials 
showing that the French law and the EU proposal, its model, deliberately targeted U.S. digital 
companies.56 French officials, including Finance Minister Bruno Le Maire, repeatedly referred to 
the French DST and the EU proposal as the “GAFA tax,” a term that stands for Google, Apple, 
Facebook, and Amazon, or the “GAFAM tax,” which also includes Microsoft.57 Again, the 
contentions of the U.S., if taken literally, lead to the conclusion that the French DST and other 
similar measures violate both the MFN and national treatment principles.  
 
 
51 Diebold supra n. 42 at 832.  
52 United States Trade Representative, Report on France’s Digital Services Tax Prepared in the Investigation under 
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 (Washington DC: Office of the United States Trade Representative 2019) [USTR 
Report].  
53 Ibid., at 30–48. 
54 Ibid., at 31.  
55 Ibid.  
56 Ibid.  
57 Ibid.  





In simple terms, the MFN treatment obligation prohibits a country from discriminating between 
countries.58  Although the expression ‘most favoured nation’ suggest that some sort of special 
treatment or privilege is accorded to the country entitled to MFN treatment, the idea underlying 
the principle is the opposite, that is the main objective of the principle is to prevent discrimination, 
by generalizing concessions made to a specific trading partner.59 Article II of GATS provides that 
each member shall accord immediately and unconditionally to services and service suppliers of 
any other member treatment no less favourable than that it accords to like services and service 
suppliers of any other country.60 Unlike the national treatment obligations, the MFN obligation in 
the GATS constitutes a general obligation which is in principle applicable across the board by all 
members to all services sectors.61 The principal purpose of the MFN provision in GATS is to 
ensure equality of opportunity for services and service suppliers from all WTO Members.62 The 
MFN provision sets out a three-tier test of consistency: (a) whether the measure at issue is a 
‘measure covered’ by GATS; (b) whether the services or service suppliers concerned are alike; 
and (c) whether the member accords ‘less favourable treatment’ to the services or services of 
another member. This article assumes that the first test is covered and, thus, analyzes only the 
second and third tests.  
WTO jurisprudence has expounded the meaning and scope of the phrase ‘treatment no less 
favourable’ in Article II(1) of GATS. In EC-Banana III the Appellate Body (AB) opined that the 
 
58 Peter Van den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization: Text, Cases and Materials, at 308 
(Cambridge University Press 2005).  
59 Robert Howse & Michael J Trebilcock, Regulation of International Trade at 54 (3rd ed Taylor & Francis Group 
2005).   
60 GATS, Art. II.  
61 See Federico Ortino, The Principle of Non-discrimination and Its Exceptions in GATS: Selected Legal Issues at 20 
(2006) http://ssrn.com/abstract=979481.  
62 Van den Bossche supra n. 58 at 319.  




phrase should be taken to include both de jure and de facto discrimination.63  Drawing further 
insights from GATT jurisprudence, the phrase ‘no less favourable’ has been described as an 
expression of the underlying principle of effective equality of treatment between imported 
products, under the most favoured national standard.64 Accordingly, a measure affords less 
favourable treatment if it adversely modifies the conditions of competition between imports from 
different states. In order to establish whether the ‘no less favourable standard’ has been met, panels 
need to determine whether the particular measure at issue has the potential to lead to the application 
to imported products of treatment less favourable, and not whether it had actually done so.65 In the 
case of the French DST, there appears to be some underlying intention on the part of the French 
authorities to accord less favorable tax treatment to the digitalized businesses of a specific country 
(the U.S.) vis-à-vis like businesses of EU countries. This can be gleaned from statements attributed 
to the French officials that imply an intention to protect like EU businesses from the tax. An 
example is a March 2019 statement by then French Secretary of State for Digital Affairs, Mounir 
Mahjoubi, that the forthcoming DST proposal “should not sanction European actors.”66 However, 
even absent such expressed intentions, if the digital tax measures only appear to impact the 
digitalized businesses of a certain country – as has been the complaint of the U.S. all along – 
despite the potential of competition elsewhere – such as from other EU countries – there is an 
MFN violation case to be made (if not necessarily won).  
 
63 ABR, EC – Bananas WT/DS27/AB/R, paras 231–234.  
64 See Ortino supra n. 61 at 24–25.  
65 Ibid.  
66 USTR Report supra n. 52 at 34; Elea Pommiers, Taxation des GAFA: la France peut-elle faire cavalier seul? (2019) 
https://lexpansion.lexpress.fr/actualite-economique/taxation-des-gafa-la-france-peut-elle-faire-
cavalierseul_2055669.html.  




There is an exception to the application of MFN as regards obligations arising from DTCs. A 
differential treatment may not be deemed a violation of MFN if it is the result of a binding DTC.67 
Thus, hypothetically, a member state (Country A) may justify a differential treatment between 
service suppliers from Country B and Country C on the basis that it has a binding DTC with one 
of those countries. It has been asserted that the exception prevents “free riders” from enjoying the 
benefits and concessions enshrined in tax treaties.68 It is arguable, however, that the exception can 
only apply where the measure is meant to avoid double taxation.69 Following that supposition, a 
state that receives less favourable digital tax treatment may attempt to enforce the MFN rule by 
arguing that it would be unreasonable to expect the article XIV(e) exceptions to extend to tax treaty 
measures that are not geared towards avoiding double taxation.70 By using income thresholds to 
distinguish between like (digital) service providers from different WTO members, a DST measure 
violates the MFN principle, unless the difference is based on a relevant DTC or, more 
fundamentally, unless the taxing state is able to show that the services in question are not alike.  
Ortino notes that GATS does not contain a definition of the term ‘like’ service providers.71 The 
issue of likeness under Article II GATS has, however, been variously addressed in GATS/WTO 
jurisprudence. In Argentina – Financial Services the AB stated that “in the context of both trade 
in goods and trade in services, "likeness" refers to something that is similar.”72 In the cases of EC 
 
67 See GATS, Art. XIV(e). This flows from Paragraph 2 of Art. II which allows a member to maintain a measure 
inconsistent with paragraph 1 (of Article II) provided that such measure is listed in, and meets the conditions of, the 
Annex on Article II Exemptions. See Catherine A Brown, Non-discrimination and Trade in Services: the Role of Tax 
Treaties, at 20 (Springer 2017) (asserting that “while the GATS provides general non-discrimination obligations, 
Member States may not challenge an alleged violation in respect of “matters that are the result of, or fall within, the 
scope of an agreement on the avoidance of double taxation (‘tax treaty’)”).   
68 See Nellie Munin, Legal Guide to GATS at 371 (Kluwer Law International 2010), cited in Jennifer E. Farrell, The 
Interface of International Trade Law and Taxation, at 186 (IBFD 2011). 
69 See Jennifer E. Farrell, The Interface of International Trade Law and Taxation, at 186 (IBFD, 2011).   
70 Ibid at 187 (citing tax sparring as a common example of DTC provisions with a different objective than the 
avoidance of double taxation).   
71 Ortino supra n. 61 at 23.  
72 Argentina – Financial Services WT/DS400/AB/R and WT/DS401/AB/R, para. 6.21.  




– Bananas III and Canada – Autos, perhaps, the relevant statement by both Panels was that “to the 
extent that entities provide like services, they are like service suppliers.”73 In other words, 
"likeness" is constituted when the compared products or services stand in a competitive relation to 
each other.74  
One of the main challenges with digital taxation is how to define those businesses that qualify as 
digital businesses. This is so because most businesses nowadays leverage digital technology.75 If 
a tax legislation defines taxable digital services in a way that singles out the businesses of a specific 
country or singles out aspects of digital business where a specific country’s companies are 
dominant while leaving out other forms of digital business where entities from other countries are 
dominant, that measure becomes liable to an MFN violation challenge. This is one of the 
arguments against the French and EU DST measures. The U.S. asserts that: 
The French DST, like the EU DST proposal, targets two categories of services where U.S. 
companies are dominant—Internet advertising and “digital interfaces,” covering online 
marketplaces for goods and services and some subscription services like dating websites. It 
does not cover other sectors where French companies are more successful, including sectors 
similar to the covered services. Additionally, within “digital interface” services, the DST 
excludes particular types of services where French and European companies are particularly 
successful.76  
The question is whether the services provided by EU suppliers are any less ‘digital’ than those 
provided by U.S. suppliers? Fleming observes that one of the biggest challenges with designing a 
digital tax system is simply that this is new territory for tax authorities. “There isn’t (one) single 
business model and the problem is that the traditional solutions (are) not applicable because there 
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L & Policy 1 at 12 (2010). See Argentina – Financial Services, para. 6.25.  
75 See Lee-Makiyama, supra n. 36.  
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are no other companies like Facebook, there are no other companies like Google or Amazon. They 
stand on their own.”77 Pointing to the character of the big “digital companies” aligns with the view 
that analysis of “likeness” should embody both the services and the service suppliers.78 However, 
the argument that these big companies are unique is not wholly convincing especially if it is largely 
based on the size (market share) – rather than service model – of the mentioned companies vis-à-
vis their European counterparts/competitors. As Farrell observes, “a small service supplier is – 
regardless of economic weight or political affiliation – entitled to no less favourable treatment than 
a large multinational.”79 In any case, although determination of likeness will always depend on the 
specific circumstances, likeness does not mean identical or same.80 It should be enough that there 
is a number of shared identical or similar characteristics.81 Kofler, Mayr & Schlager give the 
example of Amazon to question the arguments that are often made about the uniqueness of 
digitalized businesses. They highlight that even though Amazon markets products and concludes 
contracts via its online platform, recent company sales data reveals that the sale of physical goods 
to consumers (i.e. the mail order business) constitutes the most important segment.82 In other 
words, the mail order business – which is neither a new nor unique form of business, albeit refined 
by digitalization – remains the core activity of Amazon, and the physical goods continue to be 
 
77 Fleming supra n. 69.  
78 Argentina – Financial Services, para. 6.29.  
79 Farrell supra n. 69 at 184. The author bases her view on the inference – drawn from the reasoning in Canada – 
Autos – that “likeness” pertains to the form of service, i.e. whether the services are of the same form, rather than the 
form of the service provider.   
80 PWC supra n. 36 at 11.  
81 A non-exhaustive list of factors can be analyzed to determine whether services are alike. These include the services’ 
CPC classification, consumers’ preferences, and the nature and characteristics of the services (e.g. their nature and 
quality). Ibid. It has been suggested that the likeness test in the GATS should be based, inter alia, on the following 
factors: (a) service’s end-uses in a given market; (b) consumer habits and preferences regarding the service or the 
service supplier; (c) characteristics of the service or the service supplier; and (d) classification and description of the 
service in the UN CPC system. See Aaditya Mattoo, National Treatment in the GATS – Corner Stone or Pandora's 
Box 31 JWT 107 at 128 (1997), cited in Ortino supra n. 61 at 24.   
82 Georg Kofler, Gunter Mayr & Christoph Schlager, Taxation of the Digital Economy: “Quick Fixes” or Long-Term 
Solution? European Taxation 523 at 526 (2017).  




delivered in the traditional way (by parcel post).83 While Amazon’s model does not apply to all 
the companies sought to be ringfenced by current digital tax measures, the question must yet be 
asked whether Amazon’s business model washes off the “likeness” with traditional European 
goods sellers, for instance. One might even argue that the “less favourable treatment” is tantamount 
to punishing innovation. Such misgivings, perhaps, explain why some pro-U.S. scholars argue 
vigorously that such distinctions are wholly unjustifiable; that corporations of other countries, 
predominantly in the EU, have significant extra-territorial operations in the U.S. (and China) that 
also leverage digital technology; and that the US would be justified to impose reciprocal taxes on 
those European businesses following the EU’s DST.84 In any case, one of the ways in which WTO 
jurisprudence has determined likeness is by looking at whether the affected businesses are in 
competition with one another. It has been held, severally, that a determination of likeness is, 
fundamentally a determination about the nature and extent of a competitive relationship between 
and among products.85 Thus, if there is competition between service suppliers from different 
countries operating in the digital trade space – for instance over online advertising– it may be 
asserted that likeness exists between them.86  
In the light of the foregoing considerations, it seems that, absent a consensual selection of 
businesses that qualify for digital taxation, it is likely that unilateral measures run into problems 
with the MFN test. A safer alternative may be to design the tax rules in a way that captures 
digitalized businesses broadly. This may be achieved by expanding the scope of digitalized 
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85 See WTO AB Report, EC – Asbestos WT/DS135/AB/R, para. 99; See Diebold supra n. 42 at 837; China – Electronic 
Payment Services WT/DS413/10, para. 7.700; Argentina – Financial Services, para. 6.25.  
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businesses covered by the tax legislation and by lowering the taxability threshold. The problem 
with that approach, however, lies in its administrability.87   
5.2 National Treatment  
The national treatment rule requires that nonresident services or service providers not be treated 
less favorably than their domestic counterparts.88 The rule mandates that each member accords to 
services and service suppliers of any other member, in respect of all measures affecting the supply 
of services, treatment no less favourable than that it accords to its own like services and service 
suppliers.89 The national treatment obligations do not apply automatically, but only to a member 
that has made specific market access and national treatment commitments.90 Once a member has 
made these commitments they become bound in that member’s Schedule of Specific 
Commitments.91 When establishing if a discriminatory tax measure falls under the national 
treatment obligation, one must establish (i) if the service sector or subsectors are subject to national 
treatment; (ii) that the particular mode of supply of the service in question is subject to market 
access and national treatment commitments; and (iii) that there are no specific or horizontal 
limitations excluding tax treatment.92 The analysis below focuses on the third factor.93   
 
87 Administrability is a tax policy issue and lies outside the scope of this article. For some perspective on the 
administrability of digital taxes see Itai Grinberg, International Taxation in an Era of Digital Disruption: Analyzing 
the Current Debate, Taxes 73 (2019).   
88 See GATS, Art. XVII.  
89 Ibid., Art. XVII.  
90 See GATS, Art. XVI.  
91 The extension of national treatment to any sector could be made subject to conditions and qualifications. The 
implication is that each country’s commitments tend to reflect national policy objectives and constraints. See Brown 
supra n. 67 at 24. 
92 See Farrell supra n. 69 at 189.  
93 “[t]he EU Member States (including the UK after Brexit) are fully committed to market access and national 
treatment in data processing and advertising services, the two categories of classification under which intermediary 
services must fall” and that “[t]he commitment under CPC843 and CPC 871 applies to both sides of online 
intermediary services where the EU have made no relevant exceptions.” Lee-Makiyama supra n. 36. See also Dias & 
Prost supra n. 36 (stating that advertising is included in the EU's schedule of commitments on services). This article 
proceeds on the supposition that the first two elements are met.  




The national treatment principle affords flexibility to members in terms of how they treat foreign 
services/suppliers vis-à-vis their local counterparts. By virtue of Article XVII(2) of GATS, a 
member may satisfy the national treatment requirement by according NRCs either formally 
identical treatment or formally different treatment to that which it accords its own like services 
and service suppliers. Clearly, the respective treatments of resident and nonresident 
services/service suppliers need not be identical. Formally identical or different treatment shall, 
however, be considered less favourable if it modifies the conditions of competition to the detriment 
of NRCs.94 It has been asserted that the wordings of paragraphs (1) and (2) of Article XVII draw 
heavily on the reasoning of two well-known GATT panel reports: US – Section 337 and Italian 
Agricultural Machinery, respectively.95 In the former case, the GATT Panel noted that:  
The words ‘treatment no less favourable’ in paragraph 4 [of GATT Article III] call for 
effective equality of opportunities for imported products in respect of the application of laws, 
regulations and requirements affecting internal sale… of products. This clearly sets a 
minimum permissible standard as a basis. On the other hand, contracting parties may apply 
to imported products different formal legal requirements if doing so would accord imported 
products more favourable treatment. On the other hand, it also has to be recognised that there 
may be cases where application of formally identical legal provisions would in practice 
accord less favourable treatment to imported products and a contracting party might thus 
have to apply different legal provisions to imported products to ensure that the treatment 
accorded to them is in fact no less favourable. For these reasons, the mere fact that imported 
products are subject under Section 337 to legal provisions that are different from those 
applying to products of national origin is in itself not conclusive in establishing inconsistency 
with Article III:4. In such cases, it has to be assessed whether or not such differences in the 
legal provisions applicable do or do not accord to imported products less favourable 
treatment. Given that the underlying objective is to guarantee equality of treatment, it is 
incumbent on the contracting party applying differential treatment to show that, in spite of 
such differences, the no less favourable treatment standard of Article III is met.96 
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In explaining the scope of application of Article III:4 GATT (that is the meaning of the term 
‘affecting’), the GATT panel in Italian Agricultural Machinery indirectly also set out the 
underlying rationale of the ‘no less favourable treatment’ standard.97 The panel remarked that: 
The selection of the word ‘affecting’ would imply, in the opinion of the Panel, that the 
drafters of that Article intended to cover in paragraph 4 not only the laws and regulations 
which directly governed the conditions of sale or purchase but also any laws or regulations 
which might adversely modify the conditions of competition between the domestic and 
imported products on the internal markets.98  
 
It is arguable that taxes that do not explicitly target non-resident businesses, but end up only 
burdening them, for example, because few if any domestic service providers exist that surpass the 
size thresholds for the tax’s application.99 This suggests that the EC Proposal and the French DST 
may be vulnerable to a WTO violation challenge.100 Also, while the EU’s position appears to be 
that margins are allegedly so high in the digital services sector that the DST will have no bearing 
except that the targeted suppliers will be paying a “fair” amount of tax, it is arguable that a tax of 
3% on a service supplier’s turnover must have some consequence for the conditions of 
competition.101 Both could amount to de facto discrimination.  
The foregoing notwithstanding, the application of national treatment in the context of domestic tax 
policy appears significantly limited.102 While any misconceptions that the WTO plays a marginal 
 
97 See Ortino supra n. 61 at 3.  
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companies to higher taxes compared to domestic counterparts. In response, the U.S. threatened to place horizontal 
limitations on its national treatment commitments. Ultimately, the Secretariat adopted a “common ground approach” 
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role in regulating members’ tax policies were dismissed when the EU successfully challenged the 
U.S. Foreign Sales and Extraterritorial Income Exclusion tax breaks offered to U.S. exporters,103 
WTO rules are still limited in that they do not explicitly apply to tax policies outside the area of 
tax subsidies.104 The international tax arrangements that underpin the international tax regime are 
generally carved out of the WTO's jurisdiction over international trade.105 Article XIV(d) of GATS 
stipulates that:  
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which would 
constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where like 
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on trade in services, nothing in this Agreement 
shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any Member of measures: (d) 
inconsistent with Article XVII, provided that the difference in treatment is aimed at ensuring 
the equitable or effective imposition or collection of direct taxes in respect of services or 
service suppliers of other members. [emphasis added].  
A state is thus, generally, entitled to deploy tax measures that differentiate between resident and 
nonresident digital services/service suppliers, provided that such differential treatment aims to 
ensure the equitable or effective imposition or collection of direct taxes. On the one hand, this 
implies that the tax measure exception is not absolute.106 On the other hand, it implies that the 
mere existence of differential tax treatment cannot sustain a discrimination complaint. As Diebold 
asserts, it is logically consistent that differential treatment is only relevant to international 
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economic law to the extent that it modifies the conditions of competition to the detriment of certain 
foreign market actors.107  
As hinted earlier, one of the complaints of discrimination raised by the U.S. is that France’s DST 
applies to U.S. companies and not French companies108 – an argument that could  be made against 
the digital tax measures of many countries.109 It has to be said, however, that going by the language 
of the GATS exceptions, if digital tax rules are designed sui generis to apply specifically to NRCs 
in order to ensure the equitable or effective imposition or collection of tax, then they may be 
accommodated by the GATS exceptions. The footnote to GATS Article XIV(d) lists various 
yardsticks to determine whether measures are aimed at ensuring the equitable or effective 
imposition or collection of direct taxes. They include measures that apply to: (i) non-resident 
service suppliers in recognition of the fact that the tax obligation of non-residents is determined 
with respect to taxable items sourced or located in the Member's territory; (ii) non-residents in 
order to ensure the imposition or collection of taxes in the Member's territory; (iii) non-residents 
or residents in order to prevent the avoidance or evasion of taxes, including compliance measures; 
(iv) consumers of services supplied in or from the territory of another Member in order to ensure 
the imposition or collection of taxes on such consumers derived from sources in the Member's 
territory; (v) distinguish service suppliers subject to tax on worldwide taxable items from other 
service suppliers, in recognition of the difference in the nature of the tax base between them; or 
(vi) determine, allocate or apportion income, profit, gain, loss, deduction or credit of resident 
 
107 Diebold supra n. 42 at 842.  
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persons or branches, or between related persons or branches of the same person, in order to 
safeguard the Member's tax base.110  
It is arguable that – apart from (iv) which applies to border adjustable or indirect taxes – each of 
the above conditions potentially justifies the adoption of the digital tax measures discussed in this 
article. However unorthodox some of those measures may seem, they may be necessary to ensure 
the effective imposition and collection of direct taxes on income derived remotely by digitalized 
businesses and to deal with the fiscal challenges posed by the equally unorthodox modus operandi 
of nonresident digitalized businesses.111 Thus, the mere fact that those measures do not apply to 
resident businesses or apply differently between residents and NRC does not necessarily render 
them discriminatory. This is especially so since resident businesses would, presumably, also be 
taxed – usually on their worldwide income – under the state’s ordinary tax rules.112  
Although the GATS does not define the terms “arbitrary or unjustifiable” or disguised restriction 
on trade in services” – contained in the chapeau of Article XIV – it seems that those terms relate 
to measures that go beyond the purpose of ensuring the effective collection of taxes.113 Recourse 
may also be had to case law relating to the similar chapeau under Article XX of GATT. In US – 
 
110 To buttress the wide powers reserved to resident states in respect to design their tax policies, footnote 6 further 
states that tax terms or concepts in paragraph (d) of Article XIV and in the footnote are determined according to tax 
definitions and concepts under the domestic law of the Member taking the measure. 
111 Adding to this point, it is not in dispute that one of the ideas – if not the core idea – behind Pillar 2 of the BEPS 
Project is that digitalized businesses divert or erode profits from source jurisdictions – by avoiding the application of 
subsisting tax nexus rules (such as the traditional permanent establishment) – to low tax jurisdictions. This situation 
that has sparked significant public outrage and, perhaps, justifies the design of specialized rules to ensure tax 
compliance in source states. See Wei Peng, Multinational Tax Base Erosion Problem of the Digital Economy, (2016) 
7 Modern Econ J 345 (2016); David Pegg, Google Shifted $23bn to Tax Haven Bermuda in 2017, Filing Shows (2019) 
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Gasoline, the AB noted that the chapeau is intended to prevent abuse of the exception.114 The AB 
also observed that “the chapeau by its express terms addresses, not so much the questioned 
measures… but rather the manner in which that measure is applied.”115 Thus, while there is a legal 
right to invoke exceptions, “they should not be so applied as to frustrate or defeat the legal 
obligations of the holder of the right under the substantive rules of the General Agreement.”116 
This national treatment restriction on a member’s tax policy is, nevertheless, limited.117 This 
article’s view is that in the light of the wide leverage afforded taxing jurisdictions under paragraph 
(d), the chapeau ought to be applied narrowly, such that only a tax measure that  is excessive or 
“unreasonable”118 can be faulted. A narrow approach is preferable if one is to avoid undue 
encroachment on the tax sovereignty reserved by the national treatment provisions. Suffice it to 
say that taxation is traditionally viewed as an exercise of sovereign powers which every state has 
over persons and economic activities within its territory.119 Sovereignty, like the judicial concept 
of jurisdiction is guarded jealously. Sovereignty is a concept that has been harped on by states to 
assert their entitlement to initiate unilateral digital tax measures.120 For instance, responding to 
U.S. threats regarding the French DST, French Finance Minister Bruno Le Maire asserted:   
Let me be very clear: France is a sovereign nation. We take our decisions related to taxation 
issues as a national and sovereign nation. And we will continue to take our decisions related 
to taxation issues as a national and sovereign nation.121 
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While states may be willing to place limitations on their tax sovereignty for the purposes of a 
directly reciprocal and beneficial bilateral tax arrangement, they may be less willing to see their 
tax sovereignty restrained or constrained by the multilateral reciprocal arrangement which obliges 
them to commit to various tax regulations irrespective of the direct trade benefits that are acquired 
from other countries.122 It seems apposite that if one is to imply any constraint on a state’s taxing 
power on the basis of its trade obligations, rather than a DTC, the text of the trade obligations 
should be construed strictly in favour of the taxing state, such that only in cases where it is evident 
that the purpose of the tax measure is excessive or unreasonable can it be said that the measure 
violates the national treatment rule. The mere inclusion of taxability thresholds, for instance, 
should not be conclusive, even though it is arguable that the exemption for smaller suppliers 
contradicts the purpose of ensuring tax coverage of digital services.123 It seems fairly settled after 
all that the purpose of taxability thresholds in digital tax measures is simplicity of administration. 
As the OECD observes:  
The simplest way of operating the new rule would be to define a revenue threshold in the 
market (the amount of which could be adapted to the size of the market) as the primary 
indicator of a sustained and significant involvement in that jurisdiction.124  
National treatment discrimination would, however, exist if it is demonstrable that the threshold or 
other measure is arbitrary or unjustifiable. It is after all the absence of a justifiable reason for 
“discrimination” that could render a measure arbitrary and, thus, impeachable.125 It seems that 
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paragraph (d), in principle, provides ample legal justifications for a state to apply specialized tax 
rules to NRCs, provided that those measures are implemented for effective imposition or collection 
of taxes and that resident digitalized businesses are also taxed, albeit in a differential way.126 Be 
that as it may, there are hard-to-ignore pointers to intended arbitrary discrimination towards U.S. 
companies in the French DST. As the USTR Report asserts, “French officials have also expressed 
that the DST should cover the U.S. “digital giants” and not French and European companies, 
including in order to make the latter group more competitive against the former.” Evidence of this 
anti-competitive intention is also expressed in the report, to wit: 
On March 2, 2019, a member of the National Assembly stated: “We must also highlight the 
fact that the new tax will be selective. It will only affect the large digital enterprises. In this 
sector, which benefits from considerable economies of scale, this will give a comparative 
advantage to French start-ups and young fledgling entrepreneurs that could compete with 
these large, often foreign, platforms. Discussions and hearings we have had showed that a 
significant large part of the French enterprises in this sector will be largely spared from the 
future tax.”127 
If, as is evident in the above statement, the French DST measures were designed to apply in a way 
that confers competitive advantages to French and EU digital businesses over their U.S. 
counterparts, then their adoption indicates arbitrariness. The situation throws into question whether 
the motive for selection of covered services and taxability thresholds are arbitrary and 
unjustifiable. It is interesting that one French company is affected by the DST. If more local 
businesses could be covered by a broader definition of taxable services, questions would abound 
as to the justifiability of a narrow definition.  
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The approach taken by the French DST can also be evaluated from the perspective of the 
“necessity” exception, the test sometimes adopted in the evaluation of domestic measures that 
deviate from WTO law. This evaluation becomes relevant if the justification for the impugned 
digital tax measure is that it is deployed for the purpose of securing compliance with some law or 
regulation.128 Delimatsis observes that:  
The principle of necessity… constitutes the WTO heuristic device par excellence for limiting 
to very specific cases deviations from WTO law. This is particularly done through the 
identification and comparison of alternatives, which has become the conceptual tool for 
ascertaining the ‘necessity’ of a given measure.129 
The necessity test is contained in various provisions of the General Exceptions.130 Among them, 
Article XIV(c) allows a state to adopt or enforce any measure that it considers “necessary to secure 
compliance with laws or regulations which are not inconsistent with the provisions of this 
Agreement.” It is an established principle, first under GATT, that a respondent seeking to justify 
the adoption of a measure under the above exception must establish two elements: (1) that the 
measure is designed to secure compliance with laws or regulations that are not themselves 
inconsistent with provision of GATS; and (2) that the measure is “necessary” to secure the 
compliance.131 The first element requires an initial examination of the relationship between the 
inconsistent measure and the relevant laws or regulations to ascertain whether a measure secures 
compliance with them.132 According to the AB in Argentina – Financial Services, a measure can 
 
128 See, for instance, Nigeria’s Companies Income Tax (Significant Economic Presence) Order 2020, No. 21, which 
defines the term “significant economic presence” contained in and for the enforcement of section 4 of the Finance Act 
2019, No. 6. The Finance Act amends section 13(2) of the Companies Income Tax Act 1961, Cap C21 LFN 2004 
(CITA) to introduce the taxation of nonresident digital companies.  
129 Panos Delimatsis, The Principle of Necessity in the WTO – Lessons for the GATS Negotiations On Domestic 
Regulation Tilburg Law School Research Paper 04/2014 at 7 (2013) https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2375596.  
130 See GATS, Art. XIV(a), (b) and (c).  
131 See ABR Korea – Beef WT/DS161/AB/R; WTDS169/AB/R.  
132 ABR Mexico – Taxes on Soft Drinks WT/DS308/AB/R, para. 72. 




be said “to secure compliance" with laws or regulations when its design reveals that it secures or 
aims to secure compliance with specific rules, obligations, or requirements under such laws or 
regulations.133 In context, what is required at this stage is a preliminary assessment of whether the 
impugned elements of a digital tax measure are designed to secure compliance with specific 
provisions of any law of the country applying the measure.134 Any law here could simply mean a 
law that imposes tax on business income. In Argentina – Financial Services, both the Panel and 
the AB found that the impugned measures were designed to secure compliance with the overall 
objective of Argentina’s 1973 Gains Tax Law, as embodied in its provisions; that the objective 
pursued was the protection of the tax collection system against the risks posed by harmful tax 
practices of non-cooperative countries for tax transparency purposes. A similar conclusion could 
be reached with regard to the digital tax measures discussed here, if it can be demonstrated, for 
instance, that they aim to ensure that digitalized NRCs do not unduly exploit their offshore status 
to bypass taxes (paid by local service suppliers).  
The second element entails a more in-depth, holistic analysis of the relationship between the 
inconsistent measure and the relevant laws or regulations. It entails an assessment of whether, in 
the light of all relevant factors in the "necessity" analysis, this relationship is sufficiently 
proximate, such that the measure can be deemed to be "necessary" to secure compliance.135 The 
relevant factors to consider are: (1) the importance of the objective pursued by the measure; (2) 
the contribution made by the measure towards fulfilling that objective; (3) the trade-restrictiveness 
of the measure; and (4) whether any reasonably available alternative measure was identified by 
 
133 ABR Argentina – Financial Services, para. 6.203.  
134 Ibid, para. 6.210.  
135 Ibid., para. 6.204. The AB observes in this case that the analyses of the two elements should not be viewed as 
distinct. They may overlap in the sense that some considerations may be relevant to both elements of the Article 
XIV(c) defence. Ibid., para. 6.205.  




the complainant. It is the duty of the panel to conduct a “weighing and balancing” exercise on 
these factors.136   
In analyzing "necessity", a panel's duty is to assess, in a qualitative or quantitative manner, the 
extent to which the measure is capable of making a contribution to the end pursued, rather than 
ascertaining whether the measure makes an actual contribution.137 Such a contribution exists when 
there is a genuine relationship of ends and means between the objective pursued and the 
measure.138 The greater the contribution, the more likely that a measure is found to be 
“necessary.”139 If after thorough examination, a digital tax measure is found to contribute 
substantially to the prevention of base erosion the contribution is likely to place the measure in 
good stead as regards the necessity test. In that case, the measure may not be faulted even if it has 
a “limited restrictive effect” on international trade in services.140 The impact on free trade is 
outweighed by the importance of the measure to its purpose. In Argentina – Financial Services, 
measures that restricted access to Panama-based financial service providers (including by placing 
a higher tax burden on them) were held to be valid exceptions because they served the purposes of 
discouraging harmful tax practices and base erosion. From the language of that case, it seems that 
the measure may have fallen on the wrong side of the scale if it imposed "a very high level of trade 
restriction".141 This approach accords a wide latitude of regulation to the taxing state.142 In that 
sense, it can be asserted that WTO jurisprudence accords wide latitude to states adopting measures 
 
136 Ibid., para. 6.221.  
137 ABR Brazil – Retreated Tyres, para. 146–147. 
138 Ibid., para. 145.  
139 ABR Argentina – Financial Services, para. 6.234.  
140 Ibid.  
141 Ibid, para. 6.239.   
142 The broad latitude afforded by recent WTO decisions contrasts with the past where the necessity test was more 
readily applied to undermine the domestic regulatory policies of states. See Ming Du, The Necessity Test in World 
Trade Law: What Now? 15 Chinese J Int’l L. 817–847 (2016).  




to ensure that digital NRCs comply with local laws on taxation of business profits. Even if those 
measures appear to restrict market access to perceived defaulters, they will, generally, not be 
faulted, ceteris paribus. Laws that may fall into this category include Australia’s MAAL and the 
UK’s DPT, discussed in the ensuing paragraphs.     
The last factor to be considered is whether there is a reasonable alternative to the measure that is 
adopted.143 The requirement that a measure be "necessary" — that is, that there be no "reasonably 
available", WTO-consistent alternative—reflects the shared understanding of members that 
substantive GATS obligations should not be deviated from lightly.144 Thus, a measure with a 
reasonably available alternative is not considered necessary to achieve a regulatory goal.145 A 
“reasonably available” alternative must meet four conditions. It must be less trade restrictive than 
the impugned measure. It must preserve for the responding member its right to achieve its desired 
appropriate levels of protection. It is not merely theoretical in nature and will not impose an undue 
burden on the member, such as prohibitive costs or substantial technical difficulties; and the 
alternative measure must be consistent or less inconsistent with the WTO.146 
It is no secret that various tax measures have been considered or deployed to capture derived from 
remote digital operations. Given the novelty of digital taxation, it is not clear whether any 
alternative(s) would be more WTO-compliant than, say, the French/EU DST. One example, 
Kenya’s DST – a tax of 1.5% applicable to the gross value of digital marketplace transactions – 
 
143 Korea – Beef.  
144 See US – Gambling, para. 308. The overall onus to show that a measure is “necessary” rests on the respondent. As 
such, the respondent has a prima facie burden to show that there is no reasonably available alternative to the measure. 
See US – Gambling, paras 309–311 
145 Benn McGrady, Necessity Exceptions in WTO Law: Retreaded Tyres, Regulatory Purpose and Cumulative 
Measures 12(1) J. Int’l Eco L. 153 at 154 (2008).  
146 Du supra n. 142 at 832. See ABR, Brazil – Retreated Tyres, para.156; ABR, EC – Seal Products, para. 5.261; ABR 
US – Gambling, para. 308; ABR, Korea – Beef, para.166.  




does suggest the possibility of an alternative nondiscriminatory measure since it applies to both 
resident and nonresident digitalized businesses.147 The initiative raises questions as to whether the 
adoption by other states of a seemingly more restrictive and discriminatory measure (e.g. the 
French DST) is necessary to achieve the purpose of digital taxation. However, as the AB affirmed 
in European Cummunities – Seal Products,148 an alternative measure may be found not to be 
"reasonably available" where it is merely theoretical in nature. Suffice it to state that the so-called 
Kenyan alternative, thus far, exists only in theory. To this end, it is impossible to draw practical 
conclusions on its viability to meet the purposes of the French law.  
In 2015, the UK introduced the “Diverted Profits Tax” (DPT) to encourage large companies that 
try to minimise their tax liabilities through the use of “contrived arrangements” to change their 
behaviour and pay their due corporation tax, or face paying tax at a higher rate of 25%. Unlike the 
DSTs, the DPT (although commonly called the “Google Tax”) does not target specific sectors or 
companies, but rather at particular behaviors and arrangements.149 Likewise, in 2015, Australia 
introduced the Tax Integrity Multinational Anti-Tax Avoidance Law (MAAL), to “prevent foreign 
corporations from using complex, contrived and artificial schemes that enable them to have 
substantial sales activities in Australia, but pay little or no tax anywhere.”150 Unlike the DPT, 
MAAL is not a new tax, but an amendment to Australia’s GAAR (part IVA of the Income Tax 
Assessment Act 1936). The features of these alternative laws appear to be less discriminatory and, 
 
147 See Finance Act 2019, No. 23, section 3; EY, Kenya proposes Finance Bill, 2020 (2020) 
https://www.ey.com/en_gl/tax-alerts/kenya-proposes-finance-bill--2020. Kenya now proposes to use a withholding 
tax system to administer compliance with the tax. For residents and NRCs with a PE in Kenya, the tax will be offset 
against the tax payable for a year of income. See Daniel Ngumy & Kenneth Njuguna, Finance Bill 2020: Legal Alert 
(2020) https://www.africalegalnetwork.com/kenya/wp-content/uploads/sites/22/2020/05/Anjarwalla-Khanna-Legal-
Alert-The-Finance-Bill-2020.pdf.  
148 EC – Seal Products WT/DS400/AB/R; WT/DS401/AB/R, para. 5.261.  
149 See Finance Act 2015, sections 80, 81 and 86.  
150 See Avi-Yonah supra n. 11 at 72.  




perhaps, less likely to stifle competition. Yet it is not clear whether any of these regimes can meet 
the purpose of the proliferating DSTs. If the goal of these digital tax measures is to curb harmful 
tax practices by digitalized NRCs, there are indications that the DPT and MAAL can serve as 
alternatives. Australia realised billions in additional taxes, largely from ecommerce, in the first 
year of  MAAL implementation alone151 while HMRC statistics suggest a sharply declining default 
rate resulting from the DPT.152 Yet, like France, the UK remains a major protagonist of the digital 
tax drive.153 This suggests that the UK purpose – like the French – is outside the scope of Article 
XIV(c). Justification is more likely to be sought within the broader confines of Article XIV(d). In 
any case, both laws (DPT and MAAL) are not immune from some criticisms of the French DST, 
such as the inclusion of taxability thresholds that may advantage companies other than the US 
giants.154 Although, in their further defence, they do not (overtly, at least) target specific sectors, 
unlike some DSTs that are said to target “categories of services where U.S. companies are 
dominant.”155  
4. Conclusion  
The question of whether (unilateral) digital tax measures contravene the WTO principle of non-
discrimination is a complex one. The question appears easier to resolve when digital taxes offer 
differential treatment to like businesses resident in other states based on their respective origin. 
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Such treatment can be more readily characterized as a violation of the MFN principle. However, 
as regards national treatment, the numerous exemptions allowed by GATS warrant deeper 
scrutiny. This article has attempted such a reflection, zeroing in mainly on the controversial French 
DST. The analysis suggests that there exist discriminatory elements to the DST. Although 
discrimination may not be manifest on the face of the law, it may be deduced from various external 
sources, including statements attributable to the very drivers of such a law. This conclusion does 
not, however, imply that unilateral digital tax measures are innately discriminatory. Each measure 
must be evaluated on its own distinct features. In the difficulty of designing a workable digital 
services tax system, there are important lessons to be learned from the French/EC measures, 
especially as the need for further experimentation may inevitably resurface if the quest to design a 
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